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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, * 
Plaintiff-Appellee, * Case No. 900148 
vs. * 
DONALD WAYNE BROWN, * Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. * 
RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR REHEARING 
DEFENDANT'S RESTATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Is the request by the State for an evidentiary hearing 
on the issue of "Waiver" irrelevant, given the Court's rule of per 
se reversal wherever such dual representation is undertaken? 
2. Did the Court properly reach the "plain error" question 
when it was raised in response to the State's argument of "waiver"? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND OF FACTS 
Defendant accepts the statement contained in State's Petition 
for Rehearing. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The State waived the issue of whether or not the 
Defendant waived the conflict of his court-appointed part-time 
prosecutor attorney by not raising it at an earlier time in these 
lengthy proceedings. More importantly, the "inherent" conflict of 
such dual representation including its subconscious effects on the 
Defendant's attorney, the perception of impropriety, and its affect 
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on the public's confidence in the criminal justice system make a 
case-by-case analysis of waiver futile and irrelevant. 
2. The State is seeking to have the Court circumscribe its 
discretion in its application of the plain error doctrine by 
requiring a Defendant to anticipate a State's affirmative response 
of "waiver." To so bind and limits its discretion would 
substantially defeat the purpose of the plain error doctrine. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Court has not overlooked relevant facts or authority, nor 
misapplied the law. Point 1 of the State seeks to avoid, through 
the back door, a per se rule announced by the court in this case. 
Point II of the State seeks to substantially decrease the 
discretion of this Court in its application of the plain error 
rule. 
POINT I 
BECAUSE THE CONFLICT OF A PART-TIME CITY PROSECUTOR IN 
REPRESENTING A DEFENDANT IS "INHERENT," THE STATE'S 
WAIVER ARGUMENT IS IRRELEVANT. 
The State has produce an affidavit of Thomas Willmore, the 
part-time prosecutor who represented the Defendant at trial, which 
indicates that in November, 1989 (approximately 3 months prior to 
trial in February, 1990), Mr. Willmore advised the Defendant that 
he was a prosecutor for the City of Tremonton. The State, 
contending that this is not a fact it is seeking to establish, 
nevertheless requests an evidentiary hearing to establish this 
fact. Implicit in its request is the argument that if Mr. Willmore 
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had ever informed the Defendant of his status, the Defendant waived 
the conflict by not bringing it to the trial court's attention. 
The Court correctly stated that "there is no evidence in the 
record that Brown knew of Willmore's status as a city prosecutor." 
(Brown, slip op. at 7.) The State had ample opportunity to raise 
this issue in appeal and declined to do so. Neither in the Brief 
of Appellee nor in subsequent proceedings including Appellant's 
Motion to Supplement the Record and the hearing on the Court's 
Notice Of Opportunity To Be Heard on the issue of judicial notice 
of Thomas Willmore's employment as a city prosecutor did the State 
propose that a waiver had occurred. The State did not object to 
the Court's proposal of judicial notice making it clear, however, 
that it was asking the Court to follow the dissent in People v. 
Rhodes, 115 Cal. Rptr. 235, 524 P.2d 3663 (1974) in requiring the 
Defendant to demonstrate "actual prejudice" rather than follow the 
majority analysis finding "inherent prejudice." (State's 
Supplemental Memorandum on Judicial Notice Issue, pp. 2, 3). The 
State has waived its "waiver" issue by not having raised it at any 
earlier point in the extended proceedings on the "conflict" issue 
in this appeal. 
More importantly, however, the State's argument of waiver and 
request for an evidentiary hearing to establish such waiver is not 
congruent with the court's ruling of an "inherent conflict." 
An analysis of the Court's opinion readily demonstrates that 
the conflict is not and should not be waivable. The conflict 
pertains not only to readily observable and obvious factors that 
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could afford a Defendant the opportunity to make a "knowing and 
intelligent" waiver, but also pertains to the very core, "the vital 
interests of the criminal justice system [that] are 
jeopardized...." (Brown, slip op. p. 7). 
To begin with, we have the divided loyalties of the attorney, 
a disinclination to vigorously cross-examine law enforcement 
officers, a hesitancy to attack the constitutionality of laws he 
is sworn to uphold, and other perhaps unconscious influences caused 
by the divided loyalty. 
The relationship between the Defendant and his advocate can 
be compromised because of a natural hesitation to confide fully in 
a prosecutor. This may be experience as no more than a vague 
uneasy feeling and could not be identified sufficiently for a 
knowing and intelligent waiver. 
Then there is the factor that "dual representation erodes 
public confidence in the criminal justice system." (Brown, slip op. 
p. 10). This includes the appearance of impropriety, perception 
of use of connections and influence, and concern about effect of 
alienation of law enforcement agencies on future prosecution. 
The Court's analysis concludes with a per se rule of reversal 
in such conflicts rather than a case-by-case inquiry to weigh 
actual prejudice. The waiver inquiry which the State requests be 
undertaken in this case invites just such a case-by-case analysis 
that this Court has rejected. The Court has correctly recognized 
the fallacy of such an analysis. In the instant case, the State 
is requesting to make a record of what may have been said, thought, 
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and understood by Mr. Willmore and the Defendant in 1989, more than 
three years ago. Even if it were concluded that the Defendant 
fully understood and appreciated the future impact that the dual 
representation presented to him and his case (but it is anticipated 
that the Defendant would say he neither heard nor appreciated the 
alleged statement), the Defendant could hardly waive the impact on 
the public's interest in the integrity of the criminal justice 
system. 
The Court's rejection of case-by-case analysis precludes the 
State's request for an evidentiary hearing. 
POINT II 
THE COURT PROPERLY ADDRESSED THE DEFENDANT'S "PLAIN 
ERROR" ARGUMENT. 
The State is urging the Court to circumscribe the 
discretionary authority to avoid injustice under the "plain error" 
principle which it presently has. 
In the instant case, at trial the Defendant made an objection 
to offered evidence of prior bad acts on the grounds that it was 
beyond the scope of cross-examination, without also mentioning that 
it was improper under rules 404 and 405 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence. When the latter was raised on appeal as the more 
accurate and meaningful ground for the objection and error at 
trial, the State countered with its affirmative defense of a 
"waiver," thus avoiding any analysis of a rule 404 or 405 error. 
Defendant then countered the "waiver" argument by asserting "plain 
error." 
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The Court has used the "plain error" doctrine up to the 
present as a discretionary tool "to permit [the court] to avoid 
injustice." State vs. Eldridqe, 773 P.2d 29, ftnt. 8, p. 35 (Utah, 
1989). The State is asking the Court to limit its flexibility in 
using this tool by requesting a rule that a Defendant anticipate 
a State's "waiver" argument and raise the "plain error" argument 
in its initial brief. 
Under RCP 8 (c), "waiver" is an affirmative defense. A 
Plaintiff is not obligated to anticipate such a response in its 
initial pleading. Similarly, while a Defendant-Appellant may at 
times be able to anticipate such a response by the State, it is 
certainly not clear that such a response could always be 
anticipated, and it would be a serious mistake to limit this 
Court's discretion by denying it the "plain error" tool where the 
Defendant didn't properly anticipate a "waiver" argument by the 
State. 
The State further argues that the Court's rule that 
substantive legal issues, such as a state constitutional basis for 
an alleged error must be raised in the initial brief, should be 
extended to require that a procedural type issue such as plain 
error be raised in the initial brief. The two are clearly 
distinguishable. First, the substantive basis for error does not 
involve the anticipation of an affirmative avoidance of an issue 
by the State such as "waiver." Second, an analysis of 
constitutional law would usually be expected to be more extensive 
and complex than a "plain error" analysis. 
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The State cannot assert that it had no opportunity to respond 
to Defendant's "plain error" argument. Just as it argues that the 
Defendant could have anticipated its "waiver" argument, the State 
could have anticipated the "plain error" argument in its Brief of 
Appellee. In addition, it could have requested leave of court to 
file a further brief if it felt the issue required written 
analysis. URAP 24(c). Finally counsel for the State had the 
opportunity and did in fact argue against application of the "plain 
error" rule in oral argument. (See Pet. for Rehearing, p. 7). 
The "plain error" principle is one that the Court has created 
to avoid injustice when an otherwise strict application of court 
rules would result in such injustice. It would be the ultimate 
irony if this Court were to circumscribe this rule with technical 
requirements such as that espoused by the State. It would no 
longer retain the broad discretion inherent to the purpose of the 
rule. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should deny the request for a rehearing. The matter 
should be immediately remitted to District Court for the new trial 
ordered in the opinion of November 30, 1992. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this j?5 day of February, 1993. 
/'IAJAXJ^* /^AJST 
Nathan Hult 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
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